This essay examines an old question-why it is often so difficult for transplanted legal norms and institutions to take-with the hope of shedding a bit of new light on it through a specific focus on institutions for corporate governance in China. Foreign norms and institutions are borrowed because they seem to the borrowers to serve some need. Very often they are borrowed in a time of rapid social change in which the home culture, so to speak, is lagging behind. But the problem of fit is real and severe.
Second, the borrowed institution in fact does not perfectly serve any particular need in the source society. Institutions develop not in response to particular objectively defined social needs, but as a result of a complex interplay of social forces with different agendas. A given institution might be a field of contestation for different groups with radically differing goals without being the natural servant of any of them. As a result, it is virtually impossible for a borrowed institution to survive the transition into the borrowing society intact, if by "intact" we mean that it performs exactly the same function. Indeed, if it could, that would imply that the borrowing society was indistinguishable from the source society, and it is precisely the difference that prompted the borrowing in the first place.
In this essay, I look at a number of borrowings: the concept of the industrial trust, independent directors, the board of supervisors, and fiduciary duties (which might be more aptly deemed an aborted borrowing). I conclude that none of the above borrowings has taken because they were marked by a failure to understand the history and supporting institutions of the borrowed institution or concept in its home jurisdiction. I end with a speculation that it is particularly difficult for the Chinese legal system to borrow from Western jurisdictions because the Chinese system, as a result of its history both traditional and recent, is concerned more with the balancing of interests than with the vindication of rights.
I. INTRODUCTION
Thinking of law as a language is not a new idea. Prominent theories of legal interpretation rely explicitly on the metaphor, and indeed might claim that the relationship goes beyond metaphor to literal identity. 1 There is much to be said for this conception of law when thinking about the way in which institutions and norms move from one legal system to another. In particular, thinking of law as language can remind us that the boundaries of legal systems, like those of language, are so elusive that it may be impossible to say uncontroversially whether a legal system boundary has indeed been crossed. 2 At what point do we say that a norm is so new, and its source so different, that it counts as a transplant into a particular body of law, and not simply an internal development of that body of law?
Thinking of law as a language can also remind us how truly difficult-perhaps impossible-it is to accomplish a complete graft of particular norms and institutions from one legal system into another, since those norms and institutions, like particular words, existed within a particular environment that gave them meaning. 3 And studying the fate of a term or norm transplanted from our language or legal system to another can lead us to the realization that perhaps we didn't understand the functioning of the term or norm in our own system as well as we thought we did. 4 their classic texts into the Chinese of a weak and bullied nation, a tonic for strengthening the state, but also how the pursuit of wealth and power in the West had subverted those same values.
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First, although the borrowers may imagine their needs to be the same as those of the society that produced the institution to be borrowed, this is rarely so. They may misread the needs of the source society, or may misunderstand the needs of their own society-something I will look at in more detail a little later when I talk about independent directors in China.
Second, the borrowed institution in fact does not perfectly serve any particular need in the source society. Institutions develop not in response to particular objectively defined social needs, but as a result of a complex interplay of social forces with different agendas. This is the social science insight behind the joke about a camel being a horse designed by a committee. A given institution might be a field of contestation for different groups with radically differing goals without being the natural servant of any of them. As a result, it is virtually impossible for a borrowed institution to survive the transition into the borrowing society intact, if by "intact" we mean that it performs exactly the same function. Indeed, if it could, that would imply that the borrowing society was indistinguishable from the source society, and it is precisely the difference that prompted the borrowing in the first place.
II. SPECIFIC BORROWINGS
In this essay I will look at a number of attempted borrowings in Chinese corporate governance, broadly defined. The purpose of this section is to show how borrowings take place-or at least are attempted-not merely in the realm of specific norms, but also in the realm of institutions and structures. I attempt at the end to make some generalizations. Any large-scale industry-which is the material source and foundation of production in socialism-unconditionally must have a rigorous, unified will to direct the collective work of hundreds, thousands, and even millions of men. But how can the rigorous unity of wills be assured?
Only by the wills of the thousands and millions submitting to the will of a single individual.
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Given this tradition, then, it is not surprising that the Party's leaders turned to the idea of a trust in order to solve their problems of industrial organization. What makes this borrowing remarkable, however, is the fact that the leadership does not seem to have had a clear idea of what an industrial trust was, how it functioned, or why it had ever existed. The term used in the document was tuolasi, a direct transliteration of the sound of the English term with no inherent meaning in Chinese legal language then or now. Needless to say, Chinese law relating to enterprise organization barely existed in 1964, and had it prohibited holding companies, it could certainly have been amended to allow them. Moreover, the legal vehicle of the trust, with its complexities of legal versus beneficial ownership and the fiduciary duties of the trustee, did not exist at all, so a genuine trust as a replacement for a holding company would have been impossible. All the leadership seems to have meant by "trust" is "large monopolistic enterprise under unified control from the top and run along economically rational lines", but distributing a document calling for the formation of such enterprises is a very different thing from actually establishing them.
To sum up, the leadership was attempting to achieve essentially two objectives with this reform. First, it expected that re-organizing state-owned enterprises into trusts would produce economically rational (instead of administratively or bureaucratically rational) behavior, and that this would result in greater operational efficiency. Yet neither the Chinese legal system nor administrative custom at the time contained any norms about the operation of trusts that would have changed the incentive structure facing enterprise managers. "Trust" was nothing more than a word, and a foreign word at that.
Second, the leadership expected that the trust structure would solve the problem of administrative interference and multiple lines of command over enterprises. Again, however, it is easy to see why this was a vain hope. If by "trust" we mean a genuine trust along classic American lines, there existed no set of norms applicable to such organizations that could define and govern lines of authority within them. If we mean simply something akin to a holding company structure in which a parent exercises authority over a subsidiary by virtue of its ownership interest, then Chinese law at the time also lacked any set of norms that would make that possible. The only set of norms that existed within the state-owned sector-and this was the sector of concern to policymakers in this case-was Under German law, each such corporation has an elected supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat), which appoints a managing board (Vorstand) composed of senior corporate managers. The role of the supervisory board is that of overseeing the management of the company, 9 but its role is limited to just that. Its major powers are the power to appoint and dismiss members of the managing board and the power to represent the company in its dealings with members of the management board; 10 the law explicitly allocates managerial power to the managing board.
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It seems universally acknowledged in the Chinese academic and policy community that this transplant has not taken. While official commentary tends to rebuke enterprise managers in moralistic tones for not listening to the BOS, other commentators point out that while the Board's name made the trip over from Germany, the Board's powers got left behind like so much vacation luggage. The
Company Law expects that the BOS will perform a supervisory role by simply saying that it will, without actually giving the BOS any significant powers. Article 126 of the 1993 Company Law states, for example, that the BOS shall "exercise supervision over the actions of directors or the manager"
and that it has the power to "request directors and the manager to remedy a situation when the acts of such directors or manager harm the interests of the company". But nowhere does the statute provide the BOS with any powers that would make the directors and managers sit up and take note.
The October 2005 revisions to the Company Law brought a modest increase to these powers, but no qualitative change.
12
Nor does the Company Law provide structurally for the independence of BOS members from those that they supervise. As a formal matter, they are elected by shareholders, and there is no reason to expect that the interests dominating director voting will fail to dominate supervisor voting.
In reality, its members tend to be administrative cadres who are the subordinates of the enterprise's leadership. In many cases, they are representatives of the union and of the congress of staff and workers, two employee bodies in the enterprise that are controlled by the Party organization in the enterprise, which is intertwined with management. Thus, as one study of the BOS put it, "if one day they should dare to offend management and exercise the sacred functions given to them by the law, perhaps the day after proposing to inspect the finances of the company they wouldn't even have their job at the company, and therefore wouldn't be able to continue to represent the staff and workers."
13
They cannot be expected to exercise meaningful supervisory power.
Why did the powers of the BOS get lost in translation? I propose two reasons. First, Chinese legislative norms are frequently intended more for edification than for litigation. It is expected that the objects of the legislation will read the text and internalize its norms. There may or may not be an institutional structure to add strength to those norms through some kind of enforcement mechanism, but its absence is not necessarily viewed as a fatal flaw in the legislative scheme. Despite the view of policymakers that they were borrowing a successful institution of American corporate law, the reality is remarkably different. To paraphrase Voltaire's remark about the Holy Roman Empire, it could be said that at least as of the time of the borrowing, the institution of independent directors was not nearly so successful, American, or part of the law as the borrowers imagined.
First, it is not at all clear that having independent directors does in fact improve corporate performance. Several researchers have studied the effect of independent directors on corporate performance in the United States: the overall weight of their findings is that there is no solid evidence suggesting they improve it. 24 Some studies have even found a negative correlation between board independence and corporate performance. 25 The most recent comprehensive study is that of Sanjay Bhagat and Bernard Black, 26 who in a review of other studies as well as with their own research find, among other things, that:
• There is no evidence that greater board independence leads to better firm performance. Poor performance is correlated with subsequent greater independence, but there no evidence that this strategy works to improve performance.
• Having insiders on the board can add value.
27
• Independent directors with significant stock positions may add value, whereas others do not.
Intriguingly, researchers have also failed to find empirical support in China for the effectiveness of independent directors in enhancing corporate performance. One study, for example, looked at all listed companies-a sample of over 1000-of which 83 had appointed independent directors in the last three years. in performance between companies with independent directors and companies without, or for the hypothesis that there is a positive correlation between the percentage of independent directors on the board and corporate performance. 28 A more recent study found that the establishment of an independent director system was followed by a subsequent decline in corporate performance as measured by earnings per share and return on equity.
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Second, while the CSRC attempted to make a one-third independent director board presence mandatory for Chinese listed companies, state-imposed requirements of independent directors were not a significant part of American corporate law at the time of the borrowing. Prior to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, there was no general legal requirement, at the federal or the state level, for publicly listed companies to have any independent directors. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) required that listed companies have independent directors, but only for audit committees, 30 and even then the audit committees did not need to have exclusive authority to retain and dismiss the company's outside auditors. In imposing independent directors as a legal requirement, then, the CSRC displayed far more confidence in the unqualified desirability of independent directors than did the society from which the borrowing came. conflict-of-interest transactions-transactions, for example, between a corporation and one of its directors or officers, or between a corporation and another entity in which one of its directors or officers has an interest, or the taking by corporate officers of business opportunities that arguably belong to the corporation-and provide that certain consequences will follow depending on whether or not those with decisionmaking power who have a conflict of interest recuse themselves from the decisionmaking process.
"Independence" in state corporate law thus amounts only to disinterest in a particular conflict- We can't set down rules for independence. In Delaware, we're a judicial body, not a legislative one. . . . But we didn't just fall off the turnip truck, you know. We can tell whether somebody is acting independently or not. I don't think, for instance, that lawyers who get substantial fees from a corporation can be considered independent directors for most purposes, although they might be for some.
31
While the concept of the disinterested director is constantly being tested and refined through litigation, there is virtually no jurisprudence on who counts as an independent director for the purposes of the (usually federal) laws and regulations calling for them. Disinterested directors are a concept in Delaware's corporate law, and Delaware has courts and a responsive legislature that sees problems and responds to them. The NYSE rules, by contrast, carry with them no system for spotting problems and resolving disputes through a fair process resulting in written decisions. The same applies to the rules of the SOA: they come from a source that cannot be changed quickly. 32 Furthermore, if Delaware wants disinterested directors, it can give incentives to shareholders to sue if they don't get them. But the exchanges have only the blunt tool of delisting for the enforcement of their rules.
In short, what China borrowed was an institution that did not exist in the way policymakers thought it did. Legally mandated independent directors are, for the most part, 33 as new in the United
States as they are in China. The legal system of both countries thus faces a new problem in applying the abstract statutory standards in real life. China has borrowed little more than a term, but is unable to borrow the history behind that term that might give it meaning, because to a large extent that history does not exist.
C. Borrowed Norms: Fiduciary Duties
Sometimes the most interesting borrowings are those that do not take place. In 1993, China's State Commission on Reform of the Economic System (SCRES), a ministry-level government body, issued a letter to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. 34 In it, SCRES solemnly assured the Exchange that the "responsibility of good faith" (chengxin zeren) 35 provided for in Article 62 of its Opinion on 36 The Opinion, a document issued by SCRES in 1992, was at the time the closest thing China had to a law on corporate organization. Remarkably, Article 62 does not in fact refer to a "responsibility of good faith" (chengxin zeren); it refers to a duty of good faith (chengxin yiwu). Semantics, perhaps, but the choice of words can matter a great deal in the law, and indeed is often of critical importance in Chinese political discourse. See generally MICHAEL SCHOENHALS, DOING THINGS WITH WORDS IN CHINESE POLITICS: FIVE STUDIES (1992). That fiduciary duties should be hard to find is hardly surprising. The asset managers that the state was concerned with were essentially government officials at various levels, including stateowned enterprise managers. These managers, and their duties, were not different in kind from those immediately above them or immediately below them. The line between "state-owned enterprise" and "superior administrative department" (zhuguan bumen)-unlike, for example, the line between "corporation" and "shareholder"-was in many cases difficult to draw. Thus, the duties of those who managed assets were defined and enforced administratively. They were simply officials in a hierarchy; they operated within a certain incentive structure and were responsible to their superiors in various ways, but it would be utterly inapt to use concepts such as fiduciary or mandatary to try to understand or describe their responsibilities. The duty of an enterprise manager to his superiors was much more akin to that of a vice president in charge of widget operations to the president in a multidivisional American firm.
III. CONCLUSION
As the above stories show, when legal and institutional borrowings occur, a great deal can indeed get lost in translation. Why? No firm conclusions about legal borrowing in general, or in Chinese corporate law in particular, can be drawn from these samples; they were not randomly selected and have not been viewed through a consistent theoretical lens. But a few features stand out that are worthy of comment. 41 The responsibility for drafting the Securities Law, for example, was handed to a team headed by a prominent economist. First, despite maintaining a prickly nationalism on many fronts, Chinese policymakers seem very receptive to foreign borrowing. To the extent Chinese policymakers understood what a trust was, they would have understood it to be a creature not only of foreign capitalism, but of foreign high capitalism at that. Yet they were ready to borrow it unapologetically. Although this essay discusses only a few examples, modern China has borrowed-or at least sought to borrow-many norms and institutions from other countries.
Second, while the borrowing of legal concepts is in many countries promoted by legal professionals, in China the borrowing-like many aspects of the legal system itself-is the responsibility of those who simply do not know very much about law. 41 It may be initiated by officials who have little more than a surface understanding of the institution being borrowed, to say nothing of the environment in which it functions in its home jurisdiction. Thus, there is a particular danger that the borrowing will be superficial and will fail to take, or may even do damage.
Third, despite the government's often-repeated mantra of the desirability of "X with Chinese characteristics" (you Zhongguo tese de . . . ), it seems that in many cases of borrowing, remarkably little attention is paid to the need to take account of the particular features of Chinese society. In particular, it often seems that policymakers themselves, perhaps because they are such thorough insiders, fail to appreciate the sheer pervasiveness with which the norms and practices of the stateowned economy continue to permeate many realms of Chinese society, and the way in which such norms and practices distort the operation of concepts borrowed from market economies.
Finally, I wish to raise a broader question that applies to all transplants from Western legal systems into the Chinese legal system: can any transplant from a legal system structured around the notion of rights flourish in the Chinese legal system? Possibly some can, but special circumstances must be present.
Indeed, it may be that the actual workings of the Chinese legal system cannot be well understood using a concept of rights. China's legal system is, in its basic principles and assumptions, fundamentally different from legal orders whose basic principles and assumptions are derived from Roman law, however much those orders may have changed in response to the needs of the modern 42 The distinction I intend to draw is that while as a restaurant owner I may have an understandable interest in a competitor not opening down the street, the law may not give me a right to prevent him from doing so. Needless to say, the statute books of many jurisdictions are full of examples of this kind of right being granted to favored groups after successful lobbying efforts. 43 Thus, the state could take an outcome that might be merely Kaldor-Hicks efficient as among private actors and turn it, by making the winners compensate the losers, into one that was Pareto efficient. world. China's legal system cannot be understood apart from its history, and that history-whether Imperial or modern-is overwhelmingly a story of the centrality of the state. What are the consequences of this?
In Western legal systems we are accustomed to thinking about rights as binary. One either has (or should have) a right or one does not (or should not), and debates about rights are invariably conducted in those terms. In formal terms, the Chinese legal system is no different, but in practice
one frequently encounters what is called a right being treated as if it were something the strength of which varied along a continuum. In other words, rights may be treated as if they gave the holder a certain claim-sometimes stronger, sometimes weaker-against other competing interests that may or may not be characterized as rights. Whether the right holder wins will depend on the strength of the competing interests at any given moment. Conflicts between rights are not unusual in any legal system, and legal decision-makers must make a choice. What makes the Chinese system different is that instead of certain interests being elevated into the form of a right, one finds instead that rights are treated as just another kind of interest and weighed accordingly.
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In the era of economic planning, this view did no harm, and indeed was perhaps the only view possible. The right holders that mattered were all government institutions or state-owned enterprises. In disputes between them it made sense for the state to impose the solution that maximized the interests of all concerned and the concept of a robust right served no useful purpose.
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Rights represent, among other things, a choice for the right holder: they can be exercised or bargained away. This kind of autonomy makes no sense in a system of pervasive hierarchy. Why should an enterprise manager have the right to insist that screws of a certain quality be delivered, if the system would work better by delivering slightly inferior screws at a much lower cost, and making an appropriate downward adjustment in the manager's quality targets?
Perhaps surprisingly, the continuous and non-binary nature of legal rights extends to stateimposed duties as well. When examined from the perspective of binary duties, Chinese legislation can be extremely perplexing. It is full of obligations that either "should" or "must" be done, leading the Western-trained lawyer to exclaim in frustration, "Well, do I absolutely have to do it or don't I?" In my experience, few government officials will state that "should" is anything less than obligatory, but they will at the same time maintain that "must" is even more obligatory.
Legislation also frequently states that something should or must "in principle" be done, again leaving doubt as to the absolute obligatoriness of the norm. Indeed, even where the law does not explicitly provide this wiggle room, it is often implicitly present. It is a time-honored practice in China for local governments, often with central approval, to experiment with institutions and practices that everyone admits are contrary to the governing law and for which no legal exception is available. As with rights, the continuous nature of duties is a reflection of the state-centered nature of the Chinese legal system, and in particular the historical background of the modern Chinese legal system, which has evolved from a system of intra-bureaucratic communication. No successful bureaucracy operates internally on the basis of binary rights and duties. Instead, one sees a constant flow of information back and forth, and bargaining among people engaged in a long-term relationship. As a principle of bureaucratic regularity, to say that something should "in principle" or "normally" be done makes perfect sense. Assuming the general rule is wise, the state will not collapse if there are a few exceptions. This conception of duties starts to become problematic only when it is unmoored from its original intra-bureaucratic context and applied to those outside the bureaucracy.
This, I submit, is part of the problem with making borrowings from Western corporate law fit into the Chinese corporate law regime. Western corporate law does not contemplate a large state presence in the enterprises whose governance it regulates, and does not contemplate a legal system in which rights are really just interests to be weighed in any particular case against other interests that may or may not be labeled "rights". Shareholder litigation, for example, cannot serve as an effective tool of corporate governance when shareholders' statutory rights to litigate are whittled away and obstructed by the courts in the name of social stability. It is tempting to criticize Chinese courts for not giving rightholders their due. But both insiders and outside observers might better advance their respective agendas of reform and understanding by first taking the Chinese legal system as it is, and not as they wish it would be.
